insofar as they are normally responses to how we or other members of a community treat each other. My claim will be that this social dimension, when properly understood, is fundamentally a collective phenomenon, although not at the level of individual reactive emotions. For your resentment of me when I step on your foot is not an emotion that you share with me or anyone else, as according to the shared emotion model; indeed, in general no one other than you, the aggrieved party, is in a position to resent me. Likewise, your resentment in general is an emotion you feel on your own behalf and not merely as a member of some group that is the proper subject of that resentment, as on the plural subject model. And yet, I shall argue, the reactive emotions play a fundamental role in constituting distinctively human communities in part because they constitute our respecting each other and our reverence for the community itself, such that I respect you and revere the community only as one of us. Thus, although the reactive emotions in general are emotions we feel as individuals, they are nonetheless emotions we feel only as part of certain communities: communities of respect, as I shall call them.
I have long argued (in, for example, Helm, 2001 ) that various sorts of evaluative attitudes, such as caring, valuing, and loving, are to be understood in terms of a distinctive rational pattern of emotions. In understanding respect and reverence to be collective phenomena, I mean first that the relevant pattern of rationality is one that extends across multiple persons, so that what reactive emotions it is rational for me to feel is tied to those it is rational for others to feel, and second that the evaluative attitudes these patterns constitute-the respect and reverence themselves-are ours jointly. Indeed, my claim will be that these rational patterns are such as to bind persons together into communities of respect, where such communities are themselves constituted by these rational patterns of reactive emotions. Such communities can be narrower or broader, encompassing everything from the the members of a particular family to the community of tennis players to the community of all persons. In the case of the community of all persons, I shall suggest, these rational patterns of reactive emotions will prove fundamental to understanding what it is to be a person and how we are bound by moral norms.
I shall proceed as follows. In §1 I shall present, without argument, a background account of caring in terms of rational patterns of emotions. In §2 I shall extend this to think about the reactive emotions in particular, arguing that the rational patterns formed by reactive emotions are distinctively interpersonal. In §3 I shall argue that these reactive emotions constitute simultaneously the dignity of members of a particular sort of community and our respect for each other as members, and in §4 I shall defend this account of dignity and respect in the face of objections that they are inadequate for morality. Finally, I conclude in §5 with some brief reflections on the sense in which the reactive emotions are collective emotions.
instead talk of the "reactive emotions".
Emotions and Caring
In general, to care about something, for it to have import to one, is to have a concern for its well being, a concern in which one finds it to be worthy of both one's attention and action. To understand how such caring can be constituted by rational patterns of emotions, we must first say something about emotions and their objects.
Emotions in general are responses to what has import to us: they are evaluative responses to what we care about. Each emotion type has its own characteristic evaluation-its own formal object; the object one evaluates in having a particular emotion is that emotion's target. For example, when I am angry at the squirrels for eating my tomatoes, I thereby evaluate them as offensive; were I afraid of them instead, I would evaluate them as dangerous. Here, the squirrels are the target of my fear or anger, and offensiveness and dangerousness are the formal objects of anger and fear, respectively. One question these evaluations raise is why they are appropriate. Here the answer cannot simply be that the squirrels have eaten or are threatening to eat my tomatoes, for they also eat or threaten to eat the acorns from my oak tree, but that doesn't normally inspire my fear. The difference is that I just don't care about the acorns, whereas I do care about my tomatoes. It is only because of the relationship between the squirrels and something I care about that my emotional evaluation of them as dangerous or offensive makes sense. We can formalize this idea by understanding emotions to have a third object in addition to a target and a formal object: an emotion's focus is the background object the subject cares about whose relation to the target makes intelligible the evaluation of that target in terms of the formal object. That the subject cares about the emotion's focus-that the focus has import to the subject-is a necessary condition of the emotion's warrant, so that emotions are intelligible as responsive to import. This notion of an emotion's focus is important for understanding the way emotions are rationally connected to each other. For the sense in which each emotion "involves" an evaluation should be understood in terms of a commitment to the import of the focus of that emotion and thereby of its target. This means that in having one emotion, one is thereby committed to responding to the import of its focus in other circumstances with appropriate other emotions: other things being equal, therefore, one rationally ought to have these further emotions in the appropriate circumstances. For example, there would be something rationally odd about my being afraid of the squirrels and yet failing to be relieved if they don't eat my tomatoes or angry or disappointed when they do; this indicates that in feeling particular emotions we undertake what I have called transitional commitments from forward-looking emotions (like hope and fear) to corresponding backward-looking emotions (like relief and disappointment). Similarly, there would be something rationally odd about my being relieved that tomatoes were unscathed if, in the relevant counterfactual situation in which my tomatoes were eaten (or destroyed by a hailstorm or dry rot) I would not also feel disappointment; this indicates that in feeling particular emotions we undertake tonal commitments between positive emotions (like relief and satisfaction) and negative emotions (like disappointment and anger). As these examples indicate, these rational connections among emotions apply even when the emotions do not share a common target: what matters is their having a common focus. (How should I feel were the impending hailstorm to skirt to the north or were I to discover my neighbor has been poaching my tomatoes?) Emotions therefore normally come in rational patterns with a common focus.
The patterns defined by these rational connections includes not just emotions but also desires and evaluative judgments. Given my fear of the squirrels, I ought to want to keep them out of my garden, judge that they are a nuisance, and so on. In general, such a pattern of emotions, desires, and judgments is a disposition to respond to their common focus in attention and action when that focus is affected favorably or adversely. Moreover, given the rationality of this pattern, attending to and acting on behalf of the focus is something that, other things being equal, I ought to do, so that the focus is worthy of that attention and action. Consequently, to be the focus of such a pattern of emotions, desires, and evaluative judgments just is to have import to the subject, just is for the subject to care about that focus. Particular emotions, then, can be assessed for warrant depending in part on whether they fit into such a pattern with a common focus-on whether they are properly responsive to what has import to one. Indeed, import, as an evaluative property of an object to which we respond, and caring, as an evaluative attitude of a subject, are two sides of the same coin, looked at from an objective or a subjective perspective, with neither intelligible apart from the other.
Of course, something has import to us, we care about it, under a particular description. Thus, I might care about my tomatoes merely as a delicious food and so be relatively unconcerned about their appearance. A deluge of rain that leads to their splitting and cracking would then not bother me insofar as their taste is unaffected. However, if I care about my tomatoes as something to sell, then their appearance does matter, and I would be upset by their splitting (and so should take pains to prevent it). In each case, the pattern of emotions, desires, and evaluative judgments partly delimit what about their common focus is worth attending to and acting on behalf of, thereby defining a description under which that focus has import to one.
Reactive Emotions and Rational Patterns
According to Strawson (1962, 195) , the "participant reactive attitudes are essentially natural human reactions to the good or ill will or indifference of [people towards each other], as displayed in their attitudes and actions". As already indicated, among the reactive emotions are emotions like resentment, gratitude, indignation, approbation, and guilt, emotions that Strawson classifies into three types: the personal reactive emotions are emotional responses, such as resentment and gratitude, a subject feels towards those who display good or ill will towards herself; the vicarious reactive emotions are emotions like indignation and approbation a subject feels towards someone who manifests good or ill will towards a third party; and the self reactive emotions are those we feel in response to the good or ill will we manifest towards others, such as guilt or (what Bennett (2008) 
It is widely acknowledged that the reactive emotions are ways of holding people responsible for their actions, in part because in exhibiting reactive emotions we thereby call on others to respond. For example, if I shove you aside as I make my way to my seat, your resentment calls on me to acknowledge my wrongdoing and to apologize and make amends-in effect to take responsibility for my actions. As Darwall (2006, 8) notes, in exhibiting such resentment, you are addressing me with a second-personal reason: a reason "whose validity depends on presupposed authority and accountability relations between persons and, therefore, on the possibility of the reason's being addressed person-to-person". That is, your resentment gives me a reason to respond by taking responsibility in these ways, and it does so because in exhibiting that resentment you are addressing me from a position of authority, with a kind of standing to make a claim that I ought to recognize and to which I ought to respond. In this way, Darwall claims, the reactive emotions are bound up with seemingly moral notions like respect and dignity: your standing and authority to make claims on others, Darwall says, derive from the dignity you have as a person, and in addressing me with your resentment you are calling on me to recognize and properly acknowledge that dignity-to respect you. 3 As with other types of emotions, the reactive emotions exhibit rational interconnections among themselves. In part, these rational interconnections are intrapersonal. There would be something rationally odd about your resenting me for wronging you in a particular way and yet failing to resent others for wronging you in the same way. We also find rational connections arising out of tonal commitments: there would be something rationally odd about your resenting me for harming you in one situation and yet failing to feel gratitude towards me in other situations in which I notably benefit you. There are even rational connections arising out of transitional commitments. In trusting you, I am adopting a kind of optimistic attitude not simply towards some event's happening (as with hope) but rather towards another as a responsible agent, that she will respond (perhaps in 2 There is some controversy over precisely which emotions are reactive emotions; Wallace (1994) , for example, argues that there are only three: resentment, indignation, and guilt. As I have argued elsewhere (Helm, 2011 (Helm, , 2012 , we should understand which emotions are the reactive emotions in terms of the rational patterns they form, patterns that, as I shall argue below, constitute our respect for each other. Nonetheless, I shall for the most part sidestep this controversy here.
3 Darwall carefully distinguishes two kinds of respect: recognition respect and appraisal respect. Recognition respect is what I have just described: the recognition of the dignity of another; appraisal respect is a matter of thinking well of a person for his conduct or character (2006, . In what follows, I shall be concerned with recognition respect. some specific way) with good will towards me (Holton, 1994; Jones, 1996; McGeer, 2008) . Other things being equal, I ought to feel resentment when she betrays my trust or gratitude when she upholds it.
Yet the reactive emotions also exhibit interpersonal rational connections: in feeling a reactive emotion towards me and so calling on me to respond, among the responses I can be called on to have are themselves reactive emotions. Thus, if you resent me for harming you then, other things being equal, I ought to feel guilty; indeed, others ought to feel disapprobation and indignation. Similarly, if you feel gratitude towards me for benefiting you, then, other things being equal, I have reason to feel self-congratulation and others to feel approbation. In general, these rational connections are among the personal reactive emotions of one person (the "victim", as we might call him), the self reactive emotions of another (the "perpetrator"), and the vicarious reactive emotions of still others (the "witnesses"), such that other things being equal there is something rationally odd about a failure of victims, perpetrators, and witnesses to coordinate their reactive emotions in this way. What an account of the reactive emotions should provide is an explanation for these intrapersonal and interpersonal rational interconnections.
Darwall's understanding of reactive emotions and the sense in which they involve a kind of address can start to make sense of these rational connections. For if in feeling resentment you are addressing me from a position of authority to make a claim and thereby present me with a second-personal reason, then indeed I ought to respond in a way that recognizes not only your claim but also your authority to make it, and my feeling of guilt is precisely such a response rationally connected to your resentment. Of course, this on its own won't explain the rational connection between your resentment and witnesses' indignation, for your resentment is addressed to me, not them. Moreover, not all reactive emotions involve making a claim against someone, as when you feel trust in or gratitude towards me. Darwall acknowledges this (2006, 73) and rightly points out that gratitude nonetheless involves respect for the perpetrator-an acknowledgment of her standing as an accountable agent-and so is "parasitic on legitimate claims". Nonetheless, this doesn't help explain the rational connection between your gratitude and my self-congratulation; the same goes for transitional commitments between trust and resentment or gratitude.
Given the general account of emotions presented in §1, we would expect that what explains the rational interconnections among the reactive emotions is their being commitments to the import of a common focus. What is that common focus? Given Darwall's account, we might expect that focus to be other people, for it is their dignity-this kind of import-to which we respond with the reactive emotions. Yet this leads to two further questions about Darwall's account. First, for Darwall dignity is the import we have as persons, the value from which our authority to address others with second-personal reasons derives. Consequently, respect, as the proper response to that dignity, is a matter of recognizing the standing and authority another has as a person, and Darwall conceives of dignity as ontologically prior to respect. Yet what is the source of that dignity? How are we to make sense of its origins as a kind of import? Darwall provides no clear answer.
Second, it is not clear that someone's dignity as a person is what is relevant to the reactive emotions. As Strawson rightly points out, the interpersonal connection among the reactive emotions, what he calls their "human connection", is grounded in the fact that the personal, vicarious, and self reactive emotions "have common roots in our human nature and our membership of human communities" (Strawson, 1962, 201) . That Strawson mentions "communities"-plural-is important: there are multiple communities to which we might belong and within which we expect or demand respect as a response to the import we have as a member of that community. Darwall gets into trouble here by assimilating all cases of dignity and respect to the dignity of persons as such and respect for someone as a person; indeed, this is particularly clear in his discussion of the sergeant issuing orders to a private. Such an order, Darwall says, is a second-personal address, in which the sergeant must presuppose that the private can accept the authority she claims as a person, that is, from the (second-person) standpoint they both share as free and rational, and that, as a person, he can accept the specific normative requirements she attempts to place on him for the hypothetical case of occupying the role of private. (Darwall, 2006, 260) Yet the authority she claims is as a sergeant, not as a person (though of course she can have that authority only because she is a person). For it is only because she and the private belong to the same army-the same human community-that he has reason to recognize that authority and so to respect her-respond to her dignity-not just as a person but as a commanding officer.
These two issues are related. For if we have dignity not merely as persons but also as members of particular communities (including the community of all persons), then the question of the ontological origins that dignity might seem more pressing. After all, not just any group of people involves its members having a kind of standing or authority as members, and so we need to provide an account of what distinguishes the relevant sort of communities from other groups and how such communities can be formed in such a way as to explain how its members' can have dignity as members and so demand respect from (and make claims on) others. As I shall argue in § §3-4, we can do this in terms of rational patterns of the reactive emotions.
Dignity, Reverence, and the Reactive Emotions
The reactive emotions are emotions; given my general account of emotions, they are therefore commitments to the import of their focuses, such that rational patterns of these emotions constitute that import. How precisely are we to understand the focus of the reactive emotions and so the kind of import they jointly constitute?
Darwall is surely right that dignity and respect are relevant to the reactive emotions, and so we might expect that in feeling a reactive emotion we are committing ourselves to someone's dignity; but whose? In feeling resentment towards someone, you are in part demanding that she recognize and so respect the dignity-the standing and authority-you have as a community member; so it might seem that while she is the target, you are the focus of your resentment. However, it should be clear that resentment and other reactive emotions, as ways of holding others accountable to the norms of the community, simultaneously involve a commitment to the standing of the perpetrator as responsible to those norms. Moreover, they also involve a commitment to the dignity of witnesses as members of the community insofar as they call on witnesses to respond with appropriate vicarious reactive emotions, a call that is rationally connected to further reactive emotions such as resentment when witnesses fail to respond, or gratitude when they do in notable ways. In short, we cannot dissociate your commitment to your own dignity as a member of the community from your commitment to that of all other community members.
This may suggest that the import to which we are committed in feeling the reactive emotions is the dignity of community members generally. While this is correct, it is only part of the truth. For a commitment to the dignity of community members generally is a commitment to the import of their standing and authority to hold themselves and others accountable to the norms of the community. Yet such a commitment presupposes a commitment to the import of these norms as well. For these norms are intelligible as binding on particular community members as responsible agents only insofar as the community generally has the practice of holding its members accountable to norms, 4 and the import of these norms is likewise intelligible only in the context of the overall activity, practice, or way of life these norms define. Consequently, these commitments to the dignity of community members and to the import of the norms are a part of and subsidiary to a more general commitment to the import of the community itself and its defining activity, practice, or way of life. This is analogous to other cases in which we care about the means as a part of caring about the end or in which we value what a beloved values as a part of loving him. In such cases, I have argued (Helm, 2001, §4.4) , there will be a subpattern of emotions "subfocused" on the means (or on the thing valued) that is a part of the overall pattern of emotions that is focused on the end (or the beloved). Similarly, in the case of the reactive emotions, their focus will be the community itself, with the victim, the perpetrator, and the witnesses, along with the relevant communal norms as their subfocuses.
If the focus of such a rational pattern of reactive emotions is the community, then that pattern constitutes the import the community has to us-constitutes our caring about it, and the subpatterns constitute the import the subfocuses have. If individual reactive emotions are responses and commitments to the dignity of community members, to their standing and authority in the community to make demands of others and hold each accountable, then subpatterns of reactive emotions subfocused on community members generally constitutes both their dignity as community members and, simultaneously, the evaluative attitude of respect as the proper response to that dignity. Yet if the dignity of community members is a part of the import of the community-if we respect other community members as a part of our caring about the community-then this import of, this caring about, the community must be distinctive: it is, I shall say, a matter of reverence. Thus, we respect members of the community as a part of revering the community itself and its defining practice. I call such communities "communities of respect".
Dignity and Communities of Respect
This understanding of dignity as constituted by patterns of reactive emotions may seem inadequate. For partly through the influence of Kantian ethics we ordinarily understand dignity to be that import that justifies a person's being treated in a certain way and so as demanding a distinctively moral form of respect, and yet the account of dignity and respect given in §3 seems hardly adequate to morality. I start with two worries, each related to the criticisms raised of Darwall from §2. The first arises from my general claim (see the end of §1) that import and caring are two sides of the same coin. For if this is right when applied to dignity and respect, then it may seem that someone has dignity just in case others respect him, and surely that's false: a person's dignity is that to which people ought to respond with respect, whether or not they actually do. Consequently, it might seem, my attempt to answer the question, raised in §2, of the source of dignity by rejecting Darwall's understanding of dignity as ontologically prior to respect and instead appealing to patterns of reactive emotions as simultaneously constituting both is fatally flawed. Second, given the place dignity has within morality it might seem that dignity applies fundamentally to persons as such, so that we can talk about one's standing and authority within smaller communities only in a way that derives from the dignity of persons: only persons can have such standing and authority to provide others with second-personal reasons. Once again, it may seem that Darwall is right to reject the idea that dignity is relative to any particular human community but rather attaches to persons as such. I shall take these objections in turn.
First, it is surely correct that we can be mistaken in failing to respect someone. To see how this can be accommodated in my account requires thinking more carefully about who is the subject of respect. The patterns of reactive emotions simultaneously constituting dignity and respect are not simply patterns within an individual's emotional responses, so that these patterns constitute the dignity members have to me or to you, as was the case for my caring about my tomatoes. Rather, these patterns are interpersonal in the sense that in feeling a reactive emotion you are calling on others to feel corresponding reactive emotions, such that their failure to do so is, other things being equal, a rational failure, indicative of a substantive disagreement between us. This means that when such a pattern is in place, the commitment to the dignity of members is not simply my commitment or your commitment; it is our commitment. Such interpersonal rational patterns of reactive emotions therefore constitute the dignity members have to us in the community, so that it is we who respect each other, not simply each of us individually. Of course, in responding to other community members, I may fail on occasion to exhibit such respect for others, or I may even systematically-in all occasions-fail to exhibit respect for some particular member of the community, treating her as if she had no standing in the community whatsoever. Such failures are rational failures insofar as they are at odds with the overall rational pattern of reactive emotions we exhibit: they are failures properly to respond to the dignity this person has to us as a community. In this sense, then, I ought to respond with respect to the dignity she has to us and so can be mistaken in failing to respect her.
This response, however, raises a further question about what it is for someone to be a member of the community and so to have dignity as a member-and, indeed, about what defines a particular group as a community in the first place. After all, my failure to respect someone as a member of the community may be grounded in my sense that others are mistaken in thinking that she is a member of the community, and here we need to make sense of the possibility of the community as a whole being mistaken about who is or is not a member.
I noted in §1 that to care about something is to care about it as something: we don't just care about tomatoes, we care about them as delicious vegetables or as items to sell, for example. The same goes for our reverence for particular communities, by which I mean not merely that we care about them as communities of respect (for that's just to say that we revere them) but rather that we revere them as the particular communities they are: as the community of philosophers or of tennis players or of my family. This requires an understanding of that which defines the community as such, including in particular both of the norms and expectations that are binding on its members and to which they hold each other accountable, and of the membership of the community-of who are bound by and held accountable to these norms. In part, this understanding is implicit in the pattern of emotions constituting that caring. Thus, in the case of caring about my tomatoes, my understanding of them as items to sell is implicit in the way my disappointment in the appearance of a new variety of tomatoes (despite their taste) fits into the overall rational pattern of such emotions constituting my caring. Similarly, in revering this community of respect, an understanding of the norms and its membership is implicit in the overall rational pattern of reactive emotions we display, so that if through our reactive emotions we generally recognize you to have standing and authority in the community and hold you accountable to its norms, then you are de facto a member of this community. The same applies to the norms of the community: if through our reactive emotions we generally hold each other accountable to a particular norm, praising or blaming each other for upholding or violating that norm, then this is a norm of the community, de facto binding on its members.
Because an understanding of the community's membership and norms is implicit in the patterns of reactive emotions that we display and that I display as a community member, when I systematically exhibit (or fail to exhibit) reactive emotions subfocused on particular member(s) or norm(s) in ways that conflict with the overall rational pattern of reactive emotions we the community exhibit, such a conflict is between my and our commitment to import and involves at least in part a substantive disagreement over how to understand the community's membership or norms. Of course, such an understanding need not remain implicit: it can be made explicit in judgments that themselves are a part of the relevant rational patterns and so that ought to inform our reactive emotions (see §1). Thus we can articulate criteria for membership or communal norms (as well as the overall practices or way of life these norms define), thereby making explicit the understanding of the community under which we revere it. Such articulations can then lead to arguments, discussions, and potentially resolutions (or persisting rifts) in our joint understanding of the community.
I cannot here enter into a detailed discussion of how such arguments or resolutions can proceed and so cannot present a definitive answer to the question raised above about how not just an individual but we the community more generally can be mistaken about who is a member of the community and so has dignity as such. Nonetheless it is worth making two points. First, in arguing that rational patterns of emotions, desires, and judgments constitute import, I am not arguing that the evaluative attitudes (of caring, valuing, loving, respecting, etc.) are ontologically prior to the import their common focus has. Rather, the evaluative attitudes and import are ontologically on a par, with neither prior to the other. In particular, such a lack of ontological priority leaves open the possibility that both what we ought to respect depends on the dignity things in fact have, and the dignity things in fact have depends on what we ought to respect. Such a circle of dependency need not be vicious precisely because of the lack of ontological priority.
Second, we should not think that the process of joint deliberation and argument that potentially leads to a new understanding of a particular community of respect is one that ought to take place solely at the level of judgments, to which one's reactive emotions simply ought to conform. In general, one's evaluative judgments are not simply rationally prior to one's emotions, and the reactive emotions will have an ineliminable role to play in this process of joint deliberation. For, as I have argued elsewhere (Helm, 2001) , judgments can be revealed as irrational precisely because they fail to fit into the overall pattern of emotions, desires, and judgments constituting import. Indeed, such a failure can indicate that a person's considered judgments do not articulate his own understanding of the matter. Thus Huck Finn, in respecting the slave, Jim, and so feeling him to have dignity through his trust, appraisal respect, responses of guilt to Jim's disapprobation of him, etc., thereby understands Jim to be, and to have dignity as, a member of the community, even though he simultaneously judges that Jim, as property, does not merit that respect and is not a community member (Twain, 1885 , in particular Chapter XVI). 5 For in Huck's case we find it difficult to think that he really believes the judgments he sincerely makes precisely because of his conflicting emotions and motivations, leading us to think that Huck really disagrees with other members of the community in his understanding of its membership.
Together, these two points suggest that in giving an account of how a community of respect (and its membership and norms) ought to be understood and so of who really has dignity as a member of the community, we cannot ignore the rational interconnections between the reactive emotions and evaluative judgments that constitute our reverence and respect. 6 This brings me to the second objection concerning whether dignity is intelligibly relative to particular communities, as I have claimed. For dignity seems to be something someone has just because she is a person, and not because she belongs to any particular community. However, this objection presupposes that what it is about someone that makes her be a person is intelligible independent of her membership in any particular community, and it is precisely this presupposition that I want to question. On my account, the relevant sort of community is a community of respect, and "belonging" to this community just is a matter of having the standing or authority to make claims on (and so to praise and blame) others in light of communal norms, as well as to be an appropriate object of others' claims and criticism. In short, to have dignity as a person just is to "belong" to the community of persons. This is not a trivial claim, for it is a substantive claim about what it is to be a person that provides a promising route to an account of metaethics. To be a person is to have dignity as a member of the community of persons, a community whose defining membership and norms-including moral norms, binding on all persons as such-are at stake in the community's understanding of itself. Consequently, an understanding of what it is to be a person-of just which creatures are persons and of what norms are binding on persons-will be at least implicit in the patterns 5 In the book, Twain presents Huck as emotionally conflicted, feeling the pangs of conscience no matter what he does with respect to Jim's freedom. In describing Huck the way I do, therefore, I am paying selective attention to certain passages of the book and ignoring others. Such selective interpretation does not affect the philosophical point.
6 For details of how such an account can play out in other contexts, see Helm, 2001 (in the case of personal values) and Helm, 2010 (in the context of interpersonal values within loving relationships).
of reactive emotions and evaluative judgments we exhibit, patterns that make intelligible the possibility of substantive disagreement, debate, and resolution as we jointly refine that understanding. Whether this is correct or not remains to be seen.
Conclusion
I have been arguing that the reactive emotions are collective emotions not because we non-accidentally share them with others, as on the shared emotion model, nor because in some sense we feel them jointly, as on the plural subject model. Rather, the reactive emotions are collective emotions in part because they essentially form interpersonal rational patterns that define both (a) our joint evaluative attitudes of reverence for the community and respect for each other (as well as, simultaneously, members' dignity as such) and (b) those very communities themselves as communities of respect. Yet the reactive emotions are collective emotions in a stronger sense. For a creature is intelligible as having the capacity for reactive emotions (such as trust, resentment, or gratitude) as opposed to non-reactive analogs (such as expectant hope, anger, or being pleased) only because these emotions are rationally interconnected with those of others, calling on them to respond with their own appropriate reactive emotions as a way of holding each other accountable within a community of respect. Consequently, one can acquire the capacity for reactive emotions only from within a community of respect, and so the reactive emotions are collective emotions in this sense as well.
